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Introduction
The Tupamaros, also known as the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional – Tupamaros
(MLN-T) was a revolutionary movement in Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s. Using guerrilla
warfare, the Tupamaros hoped to overthrow the government and remove repressive elements
from Uruguayan society. Using a combination of military and political activity, the Tupamaros
became the most successful urban guerrilla group in Latin America. This study explores the
Tupamaros’ rise, which reached a climax in 1969 and their subsequent fall in 1970 when the
Tupamaros commenced their revolution with an assault against Uruguay’s oppressive forces,
leading to the country’s military dictatorship in 1973.
Nestled in the southern cone of South America between Brazil and Argentina lies a small
nation known for its tranquil existence. Uruguayans will proudly tell you that it is the best nation
in the world. The country has been called “the Switzerland of America” and a “Picture of
Democracy” by its admirers, titles which are perpetuated by Uruguayans themselves.1 Generally,
the country has been praised for being “a country traditionally pacifist, prosperous and with great
democratic traditions.”2 Uruguay was blessed with a history of a strong socialist democracy with
a policy of social justice that has manifested in a number of progressive reforms.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, Uruguay was viewed as a utopia in a region rife
with corruption, poverty, repression and violence. To Western observers, Uruguay was an
exemplar for the rest of Latin America to follow. In reality, this was a racist interpretation of the
region, considering the fact that over half of Uruguayans are direct descendants of European
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immigrants, largely from Spain, France, Germany and Italy.3 This perception of exceptionalism
has persisted both internationally and within Uruguay, alienating the country from the rest of
Latin America.
Uruguay has never been perfect or anything of the sort. It has never ceased to be Latin
America, despite the trouble that its leaders went through to Europeanize it. The famous
slogan of “the Switzerland of South America” is purely an Uruguayan fabrication,
invented for precisely that end: to ostracize it from the whole of America, to make it
appear as a rare case. Uruguay went through a reformative era which was the fruit of a
certain economic prosperity that allowed its government to create a fictitious atmosphere
of social welfare that kept us mesmerized for a long time. But it has never ceased to be a
dictatorship of class and when the time of prosperity passed, “Socialism” ended and the
people were forced to bear the burden of the crisis.4

In this manner, Uruguay was not unlike the rest of Latin America. By the mid-twentieth century,
Uruguay was plagued by a failing economy and increasing disparity between the rich and the
poor. Corruption was rampant, considering that the country was run by oligarchies. Considering
this, it wasn’t unreasonable that radical Uruguayans considered the possibility of revolutionary
action, inspired by their Latin American neighbors. These sentiments culminated in the creation
of the Tupamaros in 1963.
The Tupamaros began preparing for the revolution with a number of captivating
operations designed to garner public support and humiliate Uruguay’s political and business
elite. In this manner, the Tupamaros became Robin Hood figures, acting in the interest of the
poor and working classes of the country. This preparatory period of the Tupamaros’ history was
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their most romantic and memorable. By 1970, the Tupamaros determined that conditions were
right to ignite the revolution through a violent campaign of kidnappings and murders. Through a
series of miscalculations, the Tupamaros lost their public support. In this sense, the Tupamaros’
fall is more important than their rise to power, considering the fact that it represented their actual
goal of revolution. Moreover, the Tupamaros’ attempted revolution against the state led to the
imposition of emergency powers and martial law, allowing the military to defeat the Tupamaros
by the end of 1972. Despite the fact that lawlessness was brought to an end, the military had
become politicized in their fight against the Tupamaros, leading the armed forces to take power
in 1973.
In my study of the Tupamaros, the majority of the sources I have used are journalistic.
The periodicals largely focus on the Tupamaros’ exploits, which provide compelling tales of
bank heists, kidnappings and shootouts. Other journalists sympathetic to the Tupamaros’ cause
have written longer accounts to explain the Tupamaros to audiences unfamiliar with their
organization and Uruguay as a whole. The other sources I utilized are American intelligence
reports from the National Security Archives, which were declassified in 2005 under the Freedom
of Information Act. In general, there is little scholarly work written about the Tupamaros,
considering the fact that Uruguay is often overlooked in Latin American literature and viewed as
an exception to the region.
Considering the narrative of exceptionalism surrounding Uruguay and the Tupamaros, I
hope to connect the two into the narrative of Latin America’s era of guerrilla groups and
authoritarian military dictatorships. “The Tupamaros: Uruguay’s Light Bearers” follows the rise
of Uruguay in the early twentieth century and its subsequent decline, leading to the conditions
that produced revolutionary fervor within the country. The Tupamaros successfully enlightened
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the Uruguayan population of their plight through a sequence of brilliant operations, gaining a
significant following. They then proceeded with the revolution, which culminates in “Plan Satán:
The Fall from Grace.” In this chapter, I have developed an account of the kidnapping of Daniel
Mitrione, as the Uruguayan state and the Tupamaros struggled to take control of the country. My
study concludes with “Uruguay’s Moral Decline,” an analysis of the connection between the
kidnapping of Daniel Mitrione and the end of democracy within Uruguay.

5

The Tupamaros: Uruguay’s Light Bearers
In the nineteenth century, Uruguay was fragmented by two political parties: the Blancos
and Colorados. Generally, the Blanco party has been thought to represent rural interests, while
the Colorados represented the urban interests of Montevideo, but each had a sizeable pull in both
sectors.5 Historically, the Blancos and Colorados have retained roughly half of the electorate,
meaning that the two parties were constantly in conflict as they tried to retain control of the
country. In 1839, the Colorados declared war on the Blancos, beginning a twelve year civil war
known as La Guerra Grande. The Blancos had the upper hand; they had taken Montevideo. This
led the Colorados to sign an agreement with Brazil, allowing them the right to intervene in
Uruguay’s affairs, bringing the war to an end in 1851. In the years that followed, there were
several uprisings against the government as caudillo rulers on both sides tried to take control of
the nation for their respective party. Altogether, twenty-five leaders ruled the country from 1830
to 1903; two were assassinated and ten were forced out of power.6
While Uruguay was in turmoil due to political warring, the country was otherwise doing
well. Uruguay experienced an economic boom due to the Paraguayan War and increasing trade
with Europe. The country had a rise in population as a result of Italian and Spanish immigration.
The era of caudillismo came to an end in 1897, when the Blancos led a civil conflict against the
Colorados, who had been in power since 1865. The Colorados conceded, offering the Blancos
more representation. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Uruguay was moving towards a
modern state after a destructive period of contention.
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In 1903, a new president came to power, representing the Colorado party. José Batlle y
Ordóñez was unique for during his two terms in office (1903 – 1907 and 1911 – 1915), he
introduced a number of progressive reforms that led Uruguay on a new path of progressivism
and democracy. Batlle’s first term was devoted to improving the economy through foreign
investment and recovering from civil conflict, as the Blancos had led another revolt.7 During his
second term, Batlle used the economic prosperity to introduce a number of reforms. To begin
with, Batlle modeled the country after Switzerland’s socialist structure, mimicking its economic
and political system.8 His most important impact on Uruguay were his efforts to minimize the
gap between the rich and poor through social welfare, education and organized labor. Education
went through massive reform, ensuring equal access to secondary and higher education, which
was now free to all.9 Meanwhile, trade unions’ rights were guaranteed and protective legislation
was provided for workers, including the implementation of an eight-hour day and six-day week,
regulated working conditions and a minimum wage.10 These were coupled with other economic
reforms and prosperity, allowing Uruguay to extend welfare and social security to the country.
Uruguay was at its peak, now home to a social democracy and a booming economy. With
the Great War consuming Europe, Uruguay prospered greatly through the export of agricultural
necessities, such as beef, wool and wheat. More funds were provided by the newly nationalized
assets and infrastructure, including insurance companies, electricity and power, petroleum and
alcohol.11 With these newly acquired funds, President Batlle worked to provide social security
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7
and welfare for the nation. The also state took control of insurance, monopolizing the industry to
provide workers’ compensation and health insurance.12 Batlle successfully secured social
stability by redistributing income in a period of economic prosperity, promising social mobility
and enterprise within Uruguay.13 While this system of socialist democracy allowed Uruguay to
flourish, it also served as the downfall for the country.
By 1930, the money was drying up as Uruguay was hit by the Great Depression. Since
Uruguay could no longer rely on exports to finance the country, the social security system began
to crumble as it lost funding.14 As a result of the economic hardship, Uruguay fell to dictatorship
in 1933. The next decade brought a return to democracy under the Colorado Party and economic
prosperity as Uruguayan exports increased substantially during World War II. However, with
such a strong focus on exportation, Uruguay was unable to feed its own population.15 Batllismo
made a resurgence in the 1940s as Uruguay sought to address poverty, poor living and labor
conditions and economic insecurity.16 As a result, Uruguayans became increasingly dependent
on the state, which caused immense strain on the nation.
In 1950, Uruguay was forced to accept loans from the United States through the
International Monetary Fund. “As a result of US assistance, in terms of loans and ‘economic
advisement,’ wages were frozen, inflation and unemployment increased and the peso was
devalued.”17 The Uruguayan government requested more loans, pushing the country further into
debt. The economy had crumbled until Uruguay was a shadow of what it had once been. The
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cost of living doubled between 1951 and 1957.18 Inflation quickly rose in the 1950s, reaching
disastrous numbers through the 1960s. By 1962, inflation had reached forty-nine percent, rising
to eighty-eight percent in 1965 and finally one hundred thirty-six by 1967.19 In ten years, the
peso had been devalued from two-fifty to two hundred fifty for one dollar.20 Banks now either
refused withdrawals, went on strike or closed entirely.21 With the economy in such a disastrous
state, popular unrest was at its height as Uruguayans watched their quality of life deteriorate.
Meanwhile, there was a shortage of food subsidies, particularly meat.22 For Uruguayans, the lack
of meat on the market was a particularly telling example of the dreadful state that they had fallen
to considering that beef was fundamental to Uruguayan culture and their largest industry.
Uruguay was in turmoil; the economy had collapsed.
Public demonstrations became part of daily life in Montevideo in this period, as
Uruguayans displayed their vexation through protests, strikes and riots. This behavior was
actively encouraged by Uruguayan Communist Party who sought to radicalize the population.23
Strikes were so consistent throughout this period that the country could not properly function. In
fact, newspapers featured an entire section dedicated to “Strikes of the Day.”24 All unions,
representing all forms of occupations went on strike in the 1960s. “The only people who never
went on strike [were] the football players.”25 Alongside the striking unions, university students
protested the plight that they and their country faced. The government responded to the public’s
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dissent with force and repression. These are the conditions that molded the Tupamaros and
inspired them to create a revolution within Uruguay. The small country had reached its time of
revolution. The people needed to be liberated from the oppression that they endured
economically, socially and politically.
The Origin Story
The revolutionary movement in Uruguay began with a motley group of leftist and
revolutionary thinkers who loosely joined together in 1962 to discuss Marxist theory and the
possibility of revolution. What became known as Coordinador represented many different
factions of leftist thinkers, including socialists, anarchists, communists and others who did not
identify with the two main parties of Uruguay. Some members hoped to actively ignite a
revolution, while others preferred legitimate politics, but wanted to prepare for the possibility of
an authoritarian coup in Uruguay.26 Together, the members of Coordinador trained, discussed
strategies and shared tips of the revolutionary trade.
Coordinador was beneficial in aiding the plans and skills of its members. However, since
Coodinador was a coalition of various political organizations, there were no shared ideologies,
goals or strategies. This threatened the coalition as a whole, considering the fact that one
organization’s actions could endanger or compromise another organization or Coordinador as a
whole. Faced with these issues, some members of Coordinador looked to create an improved
organization to ignite a revolution in Uruguay.
Meanwhile, another form of insurgency was taking root in the northwest of Uruguay in a
town called Bella Unión in the state of Artigas, bordering Brazil and Argentina. There, a group
of disorganized sugar cane workers were trying to garner better working conditions. In late 1961,
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they met a man named Raúl Sendic, a Marxist who had studied law at the Universidad de
República in Montevideo. With the aid of Sendic, the sugar cane workers formed the Unión de
Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (UTAA). Even though they were small and untrained, the
UTAA became the most militant union in Uruguay, which was remarkable considering that at
this time, the labor movement in Uruguay was condensed in the city of Montevideo and
dominated by the Uruguayan Communist Party. Nobody would have thought to go to the rural
and poverty-stricken parts of Uruguay.
The UTAA conducted occupations and strikes at sugar cane plantations, many of which
were owned by American companies. In April of 1962, UTAA marched to the city of
Montevideo to gain more support for their cause. The march was nearly three hundred seventyfive miles, about the same distance as marching from Sacramento to Los Angeles. In
Montevideo, the UTAA were introduced to Coordinador. The relations and alliances they made
culminated in their first collaboration – together, the UTAA and Coordinador would steal
weapons from a shooting club to be split between the two organizations. However, they failed in
their escape and were discovered by the police. They offered Sendic a deal: “If he would
surrender himself and the rifles, he would receive a fair trial as a political prisoner rather than a
common criminal.”27 Raúl Sendic refused, making him an outlaw in the north of Uruguay.
The Beginning of an Era
A new organization was formed by UTAA and Coordinador’s largest sector, the Socialist
cell. This group would be more unified than Coordinador and the goal was no longer to plan for
the revolution but to launch a revolution in Uruguay. They took the name Movimiento de
Liberación Nacional – Tupamaros, which expressed their desire for the liberation of both
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Uruguayans and Latin America as a whole. This ideal was present in their name, since
“Tupamaros” is derived from Tupac Amaru, the Incan resistance leader in Peru who fought the
Spaniards in the eighteenth century, and has since been applied to other radical groups, including
Uruguayan gauchos who rebelled against the Spaniards in the nineteenth century.28
The Tupamaro’s first operation earned them the title of Robin Hood figures. In December
of 1963, the Tupamaros ordered a large delivery of Christmas foods, including turkeys and wine
to be delivered to a poor neighborhood in Montevideo. Ten Tupamaros proceeded to hijack the
truck and deliver the food to the residents. By 1965, Coordinador had come to an end, leaving
the Tupamaros to take its place. Like their predecessor, the Tupamaros were willing to include
anybody, so long as “the goal was natural liberation through armed action.”29 The Tupamaros
began recruiting, using the slogan “foco o partido” to express their willingness to accept any
revolutionaries, even communists. In this sense, the Tupamaros came to be the leading
revolutionary force in Uruguay, considering the fact that they were the only active insurgency.
The year of 1965 also marked the inauguration of another organization with very
different goals. The United States launched the Office of Public Safety (OPS) in Uruguay to
augment police capabilities with advisement, advanced technology and training, which would all
be funded by the Agency of International Development (AID). The help was necessary;
Uruguay’s police force had a low morale, considering that they were underpaid, undersupplied,
undertrained, and underappreciated by the public. From the Americans’ perspective, they
wouldn’t be any match against the communist threat, which was the main concern of OPS.30 In
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later years, Uruguay would become one of the top funded OPS program in all of Latin America,
receiving a total of one million three hundred thousand from 1969 to 1971.31
The problem with OPS and AID was that they were involved in dubious practices. OPS’s
job was to send officers to the International Police Academy and the School of Americas, where
police, military and paramilitary officers were trained “in techniques of population control,
repression, and torture.”32 While torture in Uruguay was rare in the 1960s, it became
commonplace in 1970. Many prisoners recall the presence of Americans and American
equipment. The most notable charge against OPS was Daniel Mitrione, the Chief Police Advisor
in Uruguay, a man who continues to be shrouded in mystery. Many rumors and allegations
circulate around him, including his involvement with torturing suspects or at minimum, advising
and teaching torture. However, his story will come later.
The Tupamaros’ Goals and Strategies
Uruguay was broken. Oligarchies and foreign exploitation, especially from the United
States, Brazil and Argentina, had caused a failing economy and rampant corruption. The
Tupamaros believed that the country could only be restored through the overthrow and seizure of
the government. However, the leading revolutionary theorists from Cuba had a different opinion
of Uruguay’s ability to stage a revolution. In 1960, Ernesto “Che” Guevara spoke about
revolution at the Universidad de la República; in his opinion, Uruguay’s democracy was worth
preserving. Then in 1964, Régis Debray, a radical French intellectual, spoke with members of
Coordinador. “Debray insisted that any attempt at urban guerrilla was doomed to fail, and that
Uruguayan radicals ought to model their revolution on Cuba’s Sierra Maestra foco.”33 In later
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attempts to form an alliance, Cuban leaders suggested that the Tupamaros ally themselves with
either Argentine revolutionaries or the Uruguayan Communist Party.34 In other words, the
Tupamaros were on their own. In this manner, they began formulating their own strategies,
which would be inspired by the Cuban example, but entirely new.
The Tupamaros hoped to create a foco within Uruguay, using urban guerrilla tactics in a
Cuban-style offensive to fight against capitalist exploitation and oligarchies, which they saw as
the source of inequality in Uruguay. When the conditions were right, the Tupamaros would
commence their revolution and overthrow the government. The Tupamaros’ ultimate goal was
“the creation of an independent nationalist identity for Uruguayan society and the
implementation of socialism as a socioeconomic system for the nation.”35 Through nationalism,
Uruguay would renounce political and economic dependence, while reestablishing a national and
regional identity. Socialism would provide government nationalizations and allocation of
resources, as well as a more equal distribution of wealth and income. In this manner, the
Tupamaros concentrated their revolutionary efforts.
Much of the Tupamaros’ strategy was based on Che Guevara’s notions of guerrilla
warfare. However, there would be notable deviations, particularly in location. Guevara wrote,
“the guerrilla fighter needs to have a good knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths
of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally, also, he
must count on the support of the people.”36 He notes that mountainous areas or the jungle would
be ideal. Yet, in Uruguay, the highest peak is no more than two thousand feet above sea level and
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only three and a half percent of the land is forested. There would be nowhere to hide, for about
ninety-five percent of Uruguayan land is used for livestock and agriculture.37 The Tupamaros
would not be able to escape across the borders either, for Brazil and Argentina had fallen to
authoritarian anti-communist regimes in 1964 and 1966 respectively. Montevideo provided the
same advantages as a rural setting, as well politicized urban masses to inspire and copious targets
for their operations. In this manner, the Tupamaros chose Montevideo as their battleground.
The most important lesson the Tupamaros took from Che Guevara was that “it is not
necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create
them.”38 The Tupamaros took to creating the revolution immediately, following the belief that
“the very act of arming oneself, preparing, equipping, and pursuing activities that violate
bourgeois legality, generates revolutionary consciousness, organization and conditions;” in other
words, revolutionary action precipitates revolutionary situations.39 The Tupamaros focused on
acquiring funds through bank robberies, stealing weapons from the state and gaining support by
engaging in armed propaganda. This emphasis on preparation set the Tupamaros apart from most
other Latin American guerrilla movements.
“Nobody can deny that an armed group, however small, has more possibility of becoming
a people’s army than does a group limited to issuing revolutionary positions.”40 Following this
notion, the Tupamaros avoided publishing lengthy political statements. Instead, “they felt that
actions were the most important way to create ‘revolutionary consciousness.’ In other words,
they believed that actions speak louder than words.”41 Thus, the Tupamaros instituted a policy of
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armed propaganda, meaning that their operations always had a political motivation. The
Tupamaros’ operations were intended to gain the support of the people by portraying the rampant
corruption and greed of the government and the elite. By humiliating the authorities and
portraying their superiority, the Tupamaros would gain the sympathy and admiration of the
people.42
Becoming a Tupamaro
While the goal of the Tupamaros was to gather the sympathy of the country, the hope was
that it would lead to tangible support. “Sympathizers were those who, in one way or another,
aided the Tupamaros by knowingly supplying ‘inside’ information; selling them arms,
ammunition, chemicals, and other needed raw materials; suggesting potential recruits; and
assisting in the provision of medical and legal aid.”43 Much of the Tupamaros’ most famous
operations were based on information or aid from sympathizers and disgruntled employees.
More active supporters could then make the choice to become part-time Tupamaros who lived
“legal” lives as peripheral Tupamaros. Sympathizers and peripherals were vital to the
Tupamaros’ organization; in fact, peripherals did most of the recruiting for the organization.
Becoming a Tupamaro was a lengthy process of background searches, character analysis,
sponsorship and training. Everything would be scrutinized to ensure the quality of the candidate
and the safety of the organization. Newcomers would be given a false identification and a
nickname to be used by the rest of their cell. They would first be assigned to a service cell that
focused on providing necessities for the Tupamaros. “All new guerrillas must participate in some
form of action. The new guerrilla can only learn how to wage successful guerrilla warfare
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through active participation.”44 Service work was not considered grunt work for the Tupamaros,
as it was vital to the functioning of the organization.
Service cells provided meeting places, intelligence, food, hideouts, safe houses and
clothing. They also obtained and maintained weapons, built explosives and provided medical
treatment.45 As a Tupamaro proved their reliability, they would be given the opportunity to
receive more responsibility. If they chose to, Tupamaros could move from a service cell to a
combative cell. Combatants were regarded as “the more experienced, reliable, and dedicated
Tupamaros.”46 They worked full-time and lived clandestinely. Combatants were involved in the
organization’s operations, including sabotage, reprisals, robberies and other illegal acts.
The Tupamaros were a diverse group, representing different demographics, backgrounds
and occupations. As is true of most revolutionary groups, the Tupamaros were generally in their
twenties. However, the Tupamaros boasted members as young as eighteen and as old as sixty.47
Women accounted for roughly thirty-nine percent of the organization and were involved in every
form of revolutionary work.48 Due to Uruguayan socialism, most Tupamaros were educated and
of the middle class.49 However, this certainly didn’t account for all Tupamaros. The organization
was very inclusive “from semiliterate peasants to distinguished intellectuals and professionals;
from unemployed and similarly isolated individuals to the relatives of the highest government
officials; from students in their late teens to mothers of over fifty.”50 Tupamaros and their
supporters were everywhere, in all branches of society, providing intelligence and expertise.
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They were impossible to pinpoint, for anybody could be a Tupamaro, even police officers or
government officials. This was the Tupamaros’ advantage, making them incredibly successful in
their activities.
The Tupamaros’ organization began with a single cell consisting of two to six members.
Cell members did not know the identities of other members and only referred to each other with
nicknames (for example, Raúl Sendic was known as “el Bebé”). Any unnecessary information
was avoided for the protection of the organization as a whole. Only the cell leader, appointed by
an executive committee would know how to contact other members of their cell. Each cell either
engaged in service work or combatant work. Both were expected to gather intelligence to inform
the next operations for their cell or the organization as a whole.
Multiple cells made up a column, which might be grouped according to location or type
of work (for example, the medical column). Columns were “administrative entities put together
to facilitate and coordinate the action of individual cells;” they had no hierarchy or leaders.51
They were independent entities, intended to merely divide labor within the Tupamaros. “Each
column was designed to be self-sustaining in the case of trouble at the top; thus the columns
were equipped to gather intelligence, maintain supplies, and undertake armed or propaganda
action independently, making it theoretically possible for one surviving column to regenerate the
movement.”52 Columns provided the advantage of familiarity since members were accustomed to
the locale and residents of the area, making them more effective in their operations. However,
within a columns and its cells, secrecy and anonymity was essential. Generally, Tupamaros only
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knew members within their cell and were unaware of other members of their column for cells
maintained minimal contact with one another.
Together, the various cells and columns worked to further the Tupamaros’ mission of
preparing for the revolution. Their strategy for the present and future was “to form an armed
force with the greatest possible speed, with the capacity to take advantage of any propitious
conjuncture created by the crisis or other factors. To create an awareness in the population,
through actions of the armed group or other means, that without revolution there will be no
change.”53 Thus, the Tupamaros began preparing for the revolution through a series of operations
meant to garner support, funds and supplies. In the following years, the Tupamaros would rob
banks, steal weapons and explosives and bomb symbols of their enemies. Through these
operations, the Tupamaros were gaining reputation and experience as they moved towards their
most prolific period.
Strange Forces Working in Uruguay
The conditions of Uruguay took a turn on December 6th, 1967, when the Uruguayan
president died shortly after he was elected; he was replaced with Vice President Jorge Pacheco
Areco. The newly inaugurated president “wasted no time in forming the image of himself that he
wanted to create: that of the ‘strong man.’”54 Immediately, President Pacheco worked to rid the
country of lawlessness and subversion. In 1967, he banned popular leftist newspapers, as well as
the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, both of which were well-established political
parties in Uruguay, formed in 1910 and 1920 respectively. This was the first time a party or the
press had been banned in Uruguay, considering that there was such a strong democratic history
within the country. President Pacheco also requested American assistance to defeat the
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Tupamaros. With official approval, more CIA officers were dispatched to Uruguay, while the
first nine police and military officers were sent to the School of Americas to be trained that
year.55
President Pacheco continued his onslaught in 1968 when he invoked emergency powers
in June in response to strikes and protests addressing the country’s rising inflation and cost of
living. Using Article 168 of the Constitution, Pacheco froze prices and wages, closed labor
unions, banned public meetings, established limited censorship and jailed political agitators. By
the end of the month, martial law was declared, which placed newspapers under official
censorship.56 However, the emergency powers did nothing to stop the rising inflation or the
strikes and protests that persisted throughout the city.
In one of their leaflets distributed to the public, the Tupamaros described the state of
Uruguay in the late 1960’s:
There is no freedom of opinion. Newspapers, radio programmes and political parties are
suppressed, Parliament is helpless. Hundreds of detainees fill the prisons and the military
barracks. Men are dismissed in great numbers from their jobs by government decree,
causing hundreds of families to be thrown on the bread line. The unions and the right to
strike have been trampled underfoot. Torture and beatings are inflicted with complicity of
the Judiciary. People are tried and imprisoned without proof of guilt. The incomes of the
great majority are frozen whilst an increase in affluence of a small minority is
encouraged. Corruption is rampant in the Government.57
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Considering the climate of Uruguay, the Tupamaros strengthened their preparations for the
coming offensive. In 1968, eighteen members underwent training in Cuba.58 Meanwhile, the
Tupamaros continued robbing banks and stealing arms and explosives. In the year of 1968, the
Tupamaros successfully held up five banks and one casino, stealing about twenty-six million
pesos or over six million dollars today.59 However, the Tupamaros were moving to bigger and
better things. “By 1968, the Tupamaros escalated their pressure, moving from ‘Robin Hood’
stage of self-publicity and exposing the regime to a more aggressive phase of direct challenges to
government authority.”60 The Tupamaros had moved to the next stage of the revolution.
On August 7th, 1968, the Tupamaros commenced Operación Pajarito to force President
Pacheco to support strikers’ demands. Four Tupamaros kidnapped Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, the
infamous strikebreaker and president of UTE, a power and telecommunications company. He
was a close friend and political ally of President Pacheco and also held the title of the most hated
man in all of Uruguay. He was released after five days once President Pacheco agreed to the
strikers’ demands. The Tupamaros threatened that the future safety of public officials would
depend “on the behavior of the repressive forces and the fascist groups at service.”61 Operación
Pajarito marked the beginning of people’s support of the Tupamaros. In fact, poor Uruguayans
would joke, “Attention, Tupamaros, kidnap me,” since Pereira was several pounds heavier when
he was released.62
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In early 1969, the Tupamaros began their most important attack yet. The Tupamaros had
received intelligence from an employee at Monty’s, an investment bank that had been involved
in illegal dealings in foreign currency for several clients. The robbery went smoothly; the
Tupamaros found Monty’s accounting ledgers which revealed its illegal business. After the
robbery on February 15th, the Tupamaros themselves notified both the police and the press of
their crime, before they provided the state prosecutor with the ledgers and their analysis of the
bank’s crimes. “The press releases exposed tax evasion, massive fraud and corruption reaching
to the highest levels of the government…that had the full blessing of the United States.”63 As a
result of the investigation, several businessmen and politicians were arrested for illegal dealings,
revealing rampant the corruption at the highest spheres of power.
The Tupamaros had just garnered the support of the working class, while portraying the
failings of the government. As one man explained:
I saw when Monty’s was held up. Who were the real villains, I’d like to know? Those
who went in with a machine-gun or those inside lining their pockets? The Tupamaros
don’t frighten me. What’s more if they are Communists that doesn’t scare me either. You
know what does scare me? Those people who go and play roulette and gamble three or
four million.64
The Tupamaros followed the success at Monty four days later by robbing the San Rafael Casino
in Punta del Este, a resort town for Uruguay’s elite. Two Tupamaros dressed as policemen
informed the manager that he would need to accompany them to San Rafael, as it had just been
robbed. The Tupamaros then used the manager’s keys to empty the casino’s entire vault, which
amounted to over fifty million pesos or about twelve million dollars today. However, upon
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learning that the Tupamaros had also stolen the casino workers’ paychecks and tips, Sendic
offered to return the money, stating that the Tupamaros would only steal from the oligarchies.65
During these operations, the government was working to fight the lawlessness in
Uruguay. However, the source of their problems was not the Tupamaros, but the persistent
strikes and protests that were crippling Montevideo. On June 24th of 1969, the government
initiated a limited state of siege in response to major demonstrations in Montevideo. “It was, of
course, a one-sided battle; on the one side, the police were armed with tear gas and newlyimported American guns, and on the other side, students were armed with stones, marbles and
pent-up frustrations.”66 The Tupamaros were not the government’s concern, for their operations
were considered “police matters.” With little resistance from the state, the Tupamaros continued
their campaign.
Then in October, the Tupamaros initiated their greatest operation yet to commemorate the
anniversary of Che Guevara’s death in Bolivia. The Tupamaros would take control of Pando, a
small city outside of Montevideo as a show of strength to both the public and the state. The
Tupamaros would arrive under the guise of a funerary procession with six hearses and a
procession of mourners. Roughly twenty Tupamaros marched solemnly into the city carrying the
coffin of the “deceased,” which hid the Tupamaros weapons.67 Other Tupamaros joined the
procession along the march or met their comrades in Pando, coming by bus with their weapons
hidden amongst normal possessions such as briefcases or fishing poles. Altogether, the force in
Pando was roughly fifty strong. They were distinguished by white handkerchiefs tied around
their arms.
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The Tupamaros arrived into the city at roughly noon; the operation began at one o’clock.
The Tupamaros had six targets in Pando. They intended to rob three banks and subdue the police
station, the fire station and cut communications off so the city wouldn’t receive reinforcements
from Montevideo, which was less than an hour away. The operation began with the police
station, which was occupied with disguised Tupamaros. A police officer recounted, “I found
myself looking into their guns. They were telling me to put my hands up. I laughed because I
thought it must be a joke, but I saw several chaps in Air Force uniforms, one with a submachine-gun, and heard one of them say ‘Hands up! You’re all covered.’”68 The Tupamaros
proceeded to force the police officers present into the jail cells.69 Meanwhile, another team of
Tupamaros subdued the fire station, where “five or six men were having a siesta. When they saw
us come in armed they remained paralyzed on their beds, more I think from the sheer surprise
than from fear.”70 Another team cut the communication lines to prevent anybody reporting the
situation to Montevideo. Three other teams worked to rob the banks, taking forty million pesos
or nearly ten million dollars, while other Tupamaros discussed their politics and handed out
leaflets.
Things went relatively smoothly and the Tupamaros met no resistance; all six operations
took roughly fifteen minutes, but problems arose during their escape. Pando was in chaos as
“more and more people, anxious not to miss anything, crowded the pavements, stood on
doorsteps, hung over balconies…We needed the streets to be clear, not packed with inquisitive
spectators who would get in the way of our retreat.”71 Some Tupamaros attempted to herd
civilians and direct traffic to aid their escape, but the streets were too chaotic. In their escape, the
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Tupamaros were fragmented. “We lost our identity as a group. We got into several different cars.
We didn’t know anybody.”72 Most of the Tupamaros made it to the rendezvous at the graveyard,
but some were left behind and quickly apprehended. One car had to be abandoned, as it had been
destroyed from a shootout with a lone police officer. After a short regrouping, the Tupamaros
continued on their way to Montevideo.
By now, the National Police had learned of the attack on Pando. A police patrol met the
Tupamaros at the city boundary of Montevideo, but the Tupamaros were being driven by official
uniformed chauffeurs with Tupamaros dressed as police officers, allowing them to pass through
the police barrier without incident. Afterwards, the Tupamaros split into two groups. Those that
took a more roundabout route made it safely to the city, while those that took the direct route met
the elite combat force of Metropolitan and Republican Guards. On the outskirts of Montevideo’s
suburbs, behind a sharp bend, patrol cars blocked the road. Some Tupamaros stayed to fight,
engaging in a shootout with police. Others ran into the surrounding fields. However, the police
had the advantage of helicopters, armored cars, army trucks and patrol cars. The police cordoned
the area, taking out Tupamaros one by one. “They arrested a lot of people who were completely
innocent and had nothing to do with the taking of Pando, and they treated them just the same.
Beating and pushing them around until they got to the prison van and then more beatings to get
them to get in.”73 In total, sixteen Tupamaros were captured and three were shot dead. In the
following weeks, the police used the networks of the captured Tupamaros to arrest others.74
This show of violence was unusual in Uruguay, making Pando a shocking and frightening
event to the average Uruguayan. Initially, many police officers and leading officials, including
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OPS officers, viewed the events of Pando as a success; some even believed that Pando would be
the downfall of the Tupamaros.75 However, the operation in Pando was a brilliant display of the
Tupamaro’s wit and strength, despite its unfortunate end. The Tupamaros had successfully made
themselves known, especially when considered alongside the Monty scandal and the San Rafael
robbery. The government soon recognized the Tupamaros’ effect on the Uruguayan public. “The
demonstration of guerrilla power [at Pando] was a sobering challenge to governmental
authority.”76 The government reacted by imposing further censorship, banning the terms, “cell,
commandos, extremists, terrorists, subversive, political delinquent or ideological delinquent.”77
However, the damage was already done. The Tupamaros were gaining admiration and support
from Uruguayans.
The Tupamaros continued their assault. They were so prolific that it seemed as if every
day, the Uruguayans were shocked by a new operation. By the end of 1969, the Tupamaros had
executed over one hundred operations, seventy-seven of which they considered successful.78
Their operations were having a strong effect. The Tupamaros had garnered a sizeable sum of
money and new weapons, along with a number of safe houses throughout Montevideo. By 1969,
the Tupamaros were roughly one thousand strong with a substantial support network that seemed
to grow exponentially.79As one Tupamara recalled, “It seemed like the flame of the revolution
was lighting up Uruguayan society, judging by the number of volunteers knocking on the doors
of the organization.”80 The Tupamaros even boasted supporters within the government, military,
police, and large corporations. They also had access to medical clinics with surgery and
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ambulance capabilities, therapy services and plastic surgery services.81 Altogether, it was their
most prosperous year.
The Tupamaros boasted the highest acceptance rate of any American insurgency
operating at the time.82 In this manner, the Tupamaros were becoming both an enemy and a
threat to the Uruguayan state. More importantly, the Tupamaros were becoming a potential
alternative to the state.
We too can imprison those responsible for this situation such as Gaetano Pellegrini. We
raid the homes of the compliant politicians just as they raid the workers’ homes. We
snatch the arms we need from the enemy. We do not turn to foreigners to ask them to
finance the revolution. We take the funds we need to mount the revolutionary apparatus
from the enemy. Although they try to muzzle us our voice will continue to be heard.83
As the Tupamaros engaged in more operations, garnering support from various demographics,
including those in power, the Tupamaros could be seen as a “parallel government” or a “shadow
government” by forcing Uruguayans to choose a side – the Tupamaros or the Uruguayan state.84
It had become clear that there would soon be a power struggle between the two adversaries in the
ideological war for the country.

Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 108 – 109.
Ibid, 114.
83
Gaetano Pellegrini was the Tupamaros’ second kidnapping victim. He was an Italian-born fascist and the son of
Mussolini’s Finance Minister. Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, 124 – 125.
84
Porzecanski, Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla, 17.
81
82

27

Plan Satán: The Fall from Grace
With significant support from the masses, the Tupamaros felt they were ready to stage an
uprising. They intended to demoralize and discredit the armed forces and police, as well as
destroy forces of government coercion. By 1969, the Tupamaros had moved to a more aggressive
stage of the revolution. “Years of intense preparatory work went by before the guerrillas
launched full-scale war on the government.”85 In the new year, the Tupamaros would begin their
brutal offensive.
The Tupamaros began the year with a campaign to humiliate and discredit the state. They
began with Línea Hostigamiento, a group dedicated to harassing the police. Tupamaros would
disarm police officers on the street or even in their homes to prove that they had the information
to strike at any time and any place.86 Then, on March 8th, the Tupamaros initiated Operación
Paloma, freeing thirty-eight Tupamaras from prison on International Women’s Day. It was a
great embarrassment for the government, considering that the women were only guarded by
nuns.87 Then, a naval cadet provided enough information for the Tupamaros to lead an assault on
the national naval training center. Late at night, about twenty Tupamaros disguised as navy
officers entered the premises, forcing the navy cadets out of bed. The Tupamaros made off with
over seven hundred weapons, many of which were military grade American weapons, as well as
a plethora of ammunition to go along with them. The Tupamaros now had an arsenal at their
disposal, including machine guns, semi-automatic rifles, handguns and grenade launchers.88
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Their campaign to demoralize and demean the police was taking effect, but with adverse
consequences, as the police became more dedicated in their fight against the Tupamaros. The
police had developed a new tactic that was proving extremely effective: the ratonera. Once the
police discovered a Tupamaro safe house, they would wait and arrest the members that returned,
just like a mousetrap. The Tupamaros also upped their ante with a series of cop killings. Some
had been accidents, while others were targeted assassinations. The police sought retribution for
the attacks against their own, leading to more aggressive interrogation styles, while the
Tupamaros retaliated against officers suspected of torturing detainees.
In Uruguay, torture was rare before 1970. Yet prisoner abuse was not unheard of,
especially amongst the Metropolitan Guard, an elite paramilitary police squad.89 The torture was
unsophisticated but brutal.
We had to run the gauntlet, except that we couldn’t run. They made us go dreadfully
slowly, and all the while we were being kicked and punched and beaten. The men
shouted insults at us and some howled like wolves. I felt I was going through a tunnel and
that I’d die before I got to the end. Everybody tried to get in as many blows as possible,
never mind where they landed.90
At times, other techniques were used. “They kept pushing my head under and pulling it out
again. Each time I swallowed more water. Finally I couldn’t hear what they were asking. Then
they took me out and started to burn my arms with cigarettes.”91 Police also administered electric
shocks during interrogations, but the equipment was outdated. The police’s methods were
rudimentary in comparison to the torture that would later be implemented by the military.
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Reports of torture within the police became common knowledge, leading to public
outcry. The Senate conducted a six month investigation into the matter with disturbing results.
“The use of torture by Montevideo’s police had become “habitual,” “frequent,” and even
“normal”; that it was being applied to innocent people, nonpolitical prisoners, women, students,
and labor leaders; and that torture had become a routine application of electric shock, beatings,
burns, starvation, and other cruel interrogation methods.”92 As a result of this study, the Senate
and House of Representatives voted to lift Pacheco’s security measures in July of 1970.
However, President Pacheco quickly reinstated them, allowing the continued assault against
Uruguay’s subversives.
Plan Satán
With an exceeding number of Tupamaros being held in the Punta Carretas prison, the
Tupamaros decided it was time to take action; they would commit a series of political
kidnappings and ransom the hostages in exchange for the release of their comrades. The
Tupamaros took their inspiration from their Brazilian counterparts, the Movimento
Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (MR-8), who had kidnapped American Ambassador Charles Burke
Elbrick in exchange for the release of fifteen prisoners in 1969.93 The Tupamaros had already
proven their capability with the kidnapping of Gaetano Pellegrini Gimpieto in 1969, who was
held from late September through November. Now they planned to up the ante with the
commencement of Plan Satán, which expanded the idea of a political kidnapping into a full
campaign. They planned to kidnap multiple victims, both native and foreign. The victims had to
be both important and influential to demand a strong response from the government, while also
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being morally suspect so the kidnappings would inspire solidarity from the average Uruguayan.
Diplomats were preferable, considering that the kidnapping would lead to international pressure
on the Uruguayan government.
In this manner, the Tupamaros chose their victims. Native victims chosen included Judge
Daniel Pereira Manelli, who sentenced Tupamaros; Julio Cesar Mamelli, a union official and
Walter Pintos Risso, the Minister of Works. The foreigners chosen were Dan Mitrione, the Chief
Public Safety Advisor of the American Embassy; Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, the Brazilian
Consul; Gordon Jones, the US Embassy’s Second Secretary and British Ambassador Geoffrey
Jackson. It’s notable that the countries represented were only the United States, Brazil and the
United Kingdom; the Tupamaros considered these countries to be the most heinous. All were
condemned for their interference in Uruguay, which Tupamaros saw as the plight of their
country for “although officially Uruguay has existed as an independent nation for almost 150
years, politically, militarily, economically and even culturally, Uruguay depends heavily on the
axes Brazil-Argentina and Great Britain-United States.”94 The Tupamaros also expected that
these nations would have the most influence on the Uruguayan government and would pressure
its leaders tenaciously, which would work in the Tupamaros’ favor.
For their safe return, the Tupamaros demanded the release of all of their imprisoned or
detained comrades, which amounted to one hundred fifty, “the largest prisoner ransom ever
demanded for kidnapped diplomats.”95 The Tupamaros expected that between the three nations’
demands, the Uruguayan government would be pressured enough that they would be forced to
succumb to the Tupamaros’ demands or would collapse entirely. This internal and external
pressure would work in the Tupamaros’ favor to weaken the government. “The Tupamaros
94
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sought to provoke a ministerial crisis and foreign intervention, to lead ultimately to the downfall
of the Uruguayan government.”96
By their calculation, there were three courses of events for Plan Satán. The first was that
the President would concede with their demands and release the Tupamaros. Yet considering the
fact that the executive branch had no jurisdiction over prisoners held by the judicial branch, this
would effectively be a move towards a dictatorial state, strengthening the Tupamaros’ position in
Uruguay as the government’s image faltered both nationally and internationally. Another
possibility was that faced with increasing pressure, the President would resign, leading to either a
weaker leader or one more favorable to the Tupamaros.97 Finally, the Tupamaros considered the
possibility of a foreign intervention, especially by Brazil or Argentina, which would inspire
Uruguayans throughout the country to rise against the invaders in “a mass revolution.”98 The
Tupamaros believed that in the event of any, the Uruguayan government would be weakened and
discredited, while the Tupamaros would triumph, either in popular support, image or numbers.
Their goals for the campaign showed the scope of Plan Satán and their intentions as the
revolution reached its climax.
Everything was in place for the kidnappings. The Tupamaros had learned a lot during the
kidnapping of Ulises Pereira Reverbel in 1968 and the kidnapping of Gaetano Pellegrini
Gimpieto the following year, when the Italian was held for over a month in what became known
as “the People’s Court.” Now the Tupamaros were preparing to initiate their most ambitious plan
yet. The campaign started on July 28th, 1970 with the kidnapping of the criminal-courts judge,
Daniel Pereira Manelli. On the same day, the Tupamaros also attempted to kidnap a union
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official named Julio Cesar Mamelli, but he fired his pistol, scaring away his kidnappers.99 While
Mamelli’s kidnapping was a failure, they successfully abducted Judge Daniel Pereira Manelli
from his home. In typical Tupamaro fashion, his kidnappers made sure to assure his wife that
they only wanted to “have a lengthy talk” and that he would be released within forty-eight hours.
Daniel Pereira Manelli was chosen as a victim of Plan Satán for “his alleged cover-up for police
brutality and prejudice against the Tupamaros” according to communiques published by the
Tupamaros.100 However, the Tupamaros soon decided he would be held longer for further
interrogation regarding detention and trial procedures. Meanwhile, rumors started circulating that
in exchange for the release of the judge, the Tupamaros would demand the release of prisoners.
Shortly afterwards, the Tupamaros captured their next victims.
On the morning of July 31st, the Tupamaros made their next move with the kidnapping of
the Brazilian consul, Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide from his home in the Carrasco neighborhood
of Montevideo. The Tupamaros gained entry by presenting themselves as repairmen from a light
and power company, there to repair Dias’ telephone, which had been broken for the last day.101
About nine Tupamaros entered the house with weapons drawn, leading to Dias surrendering
himself as his wife and children watched on.102 Dias was taken in his own car, which was later
abandoned when the Tupamaros switched vehicles to drive Dias to the People’s Court.103
Meanwhile, an unsuccessful kidnapping attempt was made against the Uruguayan Minister of
Public Works, Walter Pintos Risso, as he left his apartment building. However, there is
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speculation that the Tupamaros’ real target was an Uruguayan Army officer that lived in the
same building and reportedly resembled Pintos.104
In the neighborhood of Pocitos, Montevideo, another cell targeted an apartment building
that was home to two American diplomats, Gordon Jones and Nathan Rosenfeld. That morning
when Nathan Rosenfeld, the United States Cultural Attaché, went downstairs to the garage, he
was met with two young Tupamaros who mistook him for their intended target, Gordon Jones,
the Second Secretary and Economic Officer. Realizing that Rosenberg was too old to be their
target, the Tupamaros hit him over the head to knock him out, but failed to check if he was still
conscious. When Gordon Jones arrived and spotted his friend, he rushed to Rosenfeld’s side,
who he presumed to be dead, when he was jumped by the Tupamaros. The two young men then
proceeded to tie up Jones and roll him up in blankets before lying his body in the bed of a pickup
truck, leaving Rosenfeld in the garage. As they were driving away, Jones managed to roll out of
the truck at a stoplight while screaming for help; the Tupamaros drove away without him.105
What would become the most consequential abduction of Plan Satán was the kidnapping
of Daniel Anthony Mitrione, the Chief Public Safety Adviser in the American Embassy. Dan
Mitrione was a particularly coveted victim of the Tupamaros, considering the rumors of torture
that surrounded him. On the same morning as the other kidnappings, at about 8:15 a.m., Dan
Mitrione was being picked up at his home in Malvín by his driver, a police sergeant named
González. While Mitrione had been “warned to take security precautions,” he was not armed;
González, however, was armed with a .38 caliber revolver.106 The car was heading towards the
rambla, but had only gone about a block and a half when their car was cut off by a pickup truck.
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Four or five men exited the two stolen trucks and worked to abduct Mitrione. “While one man
quickly covered the police driver, the others forced Mitrione into the second pickup truck,
cursing, beating, and accidentally shooting him near the shoulder in the process.”107 The whole
event apparently happened so quickly that eyewitnesses couldn’t offer police investigators a
description of any of the kidnappers.108
Early Responses to the Kidnappings
Much of my knowledge of the kidnapping comes from a study of the Mitrione
Kidnapping, organized by the RAND Corporation for the Department of State and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The study was completed in 1977, but was not
released to the public until 1987. The other sources I have used are files from the Department of
State, many of which have only been declassified in 2005 and published by the National Security
Archives under the Freedom of Information Act. With this in mind, I will recount the response to
the kidnapping of Dan Mitrione.
The authorities were immediately made aware of the kidnappings and attempts. Sergeant
González had called the police headquarters shortly after Mitrione was taken, while Rosenberg
and Jones reported the attempted kidnappings directly to the US embassy.109 Police
investigations began immediately. The Uruguayan government “immediately responded by
branding the kidnappings as ‘police matters,’ despite the international weight of the kidnapping
campaign.110 Initial reports from the US embassy suggested that the kidnappings were made by
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“terrorists, presumably MLN or FARO.”111 Sweeping searches and roadblocks were
immediately set up by the police, but were ineffective, considering the lack of manpower. For
this reason, police officers were brought in from the interior and several military units were
incorporated into the police force to aid in the effort, but a lack of coordination was hampering
the efficiency of the joint search.112
By 1:15 p.m. on July 31st, the kidnappings were announced to the public on the radio. 113
Then, in the late afternoon, the Tupamaros issued their first communique regarding the fresh
batch of kidnappings. Communique #3 described Mitrione’s condition and the treatment he was
receiving for his gunshot wound. While early reports had suggested that they would only request
a ransom of several prisoners, Communique #3 clarified that the Tupamaros would demand “the
liberation of all ‘political prisoners’ then being held by the police, in exchange for Mitrione and
Dias Gomide.”114 They also included Mitrione’s personal card and described two of his personal
effects as proof of the communique’s authenticity.115
Shortly after receiving the communique, Ambassador Charles Adair began regular
meetings with Foreign Minister Peirano Facio. The Foreign Minister expressed the Uruguayan
government’s doubt of the authenticity of the note, which led to the decision to wait for further
word from the Tupamaros. Moreover, the Uruguayan government was reluctant to respond to the
Tupamaros due to their confusion over the Tupamaros’ message. Communique #3 did not
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demand a specific ransom and the Uruguayan government “did not believe that it could respond
until it knew what it was responding to.”116 The Uruguayan response was worrying to
Ambassador Adair, who thought that this tactic could waste time and lead to a stalemate in
communication. However, the Uruguayan government was in a precarious situation. On the one
hand, their actions would directly affect the treatment and fate of the kidnapping victims. If
things went sour and it was believed that the Uruguayan government had made an error in
judgement, Uruguay could face a poor international image and a deterioration in diplomatic
relations with the United States or Brazil. For this reason, the Uruguayan government chose to
wait until they had more information through police investigation and the Tupamaros’
communiques.
Meanwhile, the three remaining Public Safety Division officers worked to advise the
police, improving the police’s efficiency. “During the first twenty-four hours, Uruguayan police
detained numerous suspects, while police and military checkpoints throughout Montevideo and
its environs halted and examined tens of thousands of vehicles and pedestrians.”117 More than
fifty were arrested in that time, including a Tupamaro who participated in the Mitrione
kidnapping.118 The police also discovered the stolen vehicles that had been used in the
kidnappings.119
By August 2nd, the two requested Office of Public Safety agents arrived from
Washington. With the help of the OPS officers, police operations were strengthened, now aided
by the Army, Air Force, Navy and fire departments, amounting to a force of several thousand. 120
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The police led “broad, sweeping searches of entire areas, sealing them off beforehand, then
checking house-to-house.”121 Over one thousand raids were conducted in a single day, as police
searched the homes of ordinary citizens in search of the kidnapping victims.122 Medical clinics
received great attention, considering Mitrione’s gunshot wound.123 They also continued to check
everybody leaving the city of Montevideo, as well as those leaving the country by air, water or
car. Meanwhile, the Tupamaros were conducting operations as if nothing was out of the
ordinary, including two bank robberies. The Tupamaros imprisoned at the Puntas Carretas prison
also reinstituted drills and training in the prison’s courtyard in preparation for their liberation and
renewed campaign.124
At 3:30 p.m. on August 2nd, the Tupamaros issued their next communique. Communique
#4 assured that the prisoners were in good health and Mitrione was recovering well from his
gunshot wound, likely in response to the United States’ effort to make a humanitarian plea for
the release of Mitrione. The Tupamaros then demanded the release of “all prisoners judged or
condemned for political crimes anywhere in the country, except those individuals who chose to
stay and serve their sentence.”125 All freed prisoners were to be sent to Mexico, Peru or Algeria.
However, no deadline was set and no consequences were stated should their demands be
ignored.126
The next morning, Ambassador Adair met with President Pacheco. Now that the
Tupamaros had demanded a specific ransom, Adair sought to determine what the Uruguayan
government’s course of action would be. However,
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The President observed that the MLN messages had not been directed to any state
institution or office, but rather were aimed at Uruguayan society as a whole. Thus the
demands amounted to a blackmail effort against the entire Uruguayan nation. Moreover,
the demands were so unreasonable that the MLN appeared to be deliberately seeking the
impossible.127
The President resolved to have “a concrete and direct communique [from the Tupamaros] before
revealing their hand” and were unwilling to make concessions or negotiate with terrorists.128
Despite this seeming lack of response, President Pacheco sent a message to President Nixon the
same day, vowing to use “all means at our disposal to secure Mitrione’s liberation.”129 The
Uruguayan government expected to respond in the next forty-eight hours, as President Pacheco
believed that the Tupamaros would soon issue another note with more reasonable requests.130
Until then the Uruguayan government would stand resolute in its stance.
Following this line of thinking, the President asked General Antonio Francese, the
Minister of Interior, to address the public. On August 3rd, at noon, the Ministry of Interior
published its communique, which questioned the legitimacy of the Tupamaros and rejected their
demands altogether. The communique stated that the police would continue their efforts to
recover the kidnapped victims, despite the danger and causalities they faced “defending society
against delinquency.”131 They also reaffirmed their rejection of the Tupamaros’ legitimacy,
stating that the term “political prisoners” did not apply to the more than one hundred Tupamaros
imprisoned, for the Tupamaros were merely “common criminals,” as opposed to a political
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force.132 Finally, the communique frankly informed the Uruguayan public that “there was no
guarantee that the kidnappers would subsequently halt their activities, let alone repent and return
stolen arms,” noting that the Tupamaros had made no sign of conciliation.133 The government’s
communique sent a strong message to the public and the Tupamaros, garnering a strong response
from each in the coming days.
The following day, the Tupamaros released Judge Daniel Pereira from the People’s
Prison at 9:30 p.m. along with a new communique, rejecting the Ministry of the Interior’s
statement altogether. Communique #5 stated that the Tupamaros had stayed true to their word,
releasing Pereira as promised (although a few days late), despite his crimes: “incorrect
processing of captured Tupamaros, malfeasance, the holding of arrested Tupamaros for more
than 48 hours without due process, and torture.”134 This act of good faith reassured the
government that the Tupamaros would release their prisoners after having sufficiently
interrogated their victims and published the damning confessions. Also, police captured four
relatively notable Tupamaros that day. For a short period, it seemed like things were looking up.
Uruguay’s Divided Opinions
The government’s response was becoming increasingly fragmented. The police
represented the face of Uruguay’s response to the Tupamaro kidnappings and they continued to
conduct quasi-legal raids on the public in hope of securing the kidnapped victims. The President
maintained his support of the police force, reasserting that the whole thing was “police matters.”
Legally, he could not capitulate to the Tupamaros’ demands for the release of over one hundred
prisoners under the Uruguayan Constitution. Moreover, President Pacheco stubbornly
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maintained a strong stance against any form of negotiation with the criminals, even if that meant
communicating with them. The military strongly supported this position, as they opposed any
concessions and did not want the government to show any “hint of weakness or willingness to
capitulate.”135
Much of the hardline policies of the Executive Branch and the military stemmed from
their vow to respect the Uruguayan Constitution and maintain democratic principles.
Uruguayans in general had placed a high value on their country’s historic image and
performance as one of Latin America’s successful liberal democracies. They had enjoyed
a long tradition of stable civilian rule alongside an essentially apolitical military, in a
continent where military dictatorships had flourished on all sides for many years. In
addition, Uruguayan leaders took great care to abide by the constitutional and legal
precepts for institutional behavior.136
Moreover, the President could not legally free the Tupamaros demanded for the ransom. “The
Judicial branch held jurisdiction over most of the imprisoned MLN members, and any unilateral
move by the Executive branch to release them would be considered dictatorial by both the
Judicial and Legislative branches.”137
Constitutionally, the President had no right to release the prisoners and the Judicial
Branch had already privately agreed to reject any notion of freeing the prisoners for the
aforementioned rationale. While, the president did have the authority to pardon the prisoners
under Uruguayan law, President Pacheco was too stubborn to consider it.138 The President’s
strong message was a reassurance to his own government, the public and the international
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community that Uruguay would remain democratic and would not fall into dictatorial means. For
this reason, the President remained distant from the kidnappings.
The Foreign Minister and Vice President supported a more lenient approach and
advocated for negotiations or at minimum, communications with the Tupamaros, which of
course would not threaten legality under the Constitution. This method was supported by
Ambassador. Numerous avenues were taken to attempt to communicate with the Tupamaros
outside of communiques. The Foreign Minister reportedly met privately with lawyers who had
defended the Tupamaros in hope of opening a line of communication on August 5th and 6th,
which was likely supported by the President, despite his firm public stance.139
Alternatives to the Tupamaros’ demands were also being considered at this time,
including amnesty, exile or deportation. While the Executive Branch focused on police
operations and the Judicial Branch opposed a prisoner release, some members of the Legislative
Branch increasingly supported “negotiations or some formula that might lead to some prisoner
release.”140 A bill for the amnesty of the Tupamaros was submitted on August 4th. Despite the
fact that amnesty had to be authorized by the Legislative Branch, many congressmen felt that
they could not vote in favor of amnesty unless they had the approval of the Executive Branch so
the bill did not pass.141
The People’s Prison
Meanwhile, Dan Mitrione and the other prisoners were being interrogated by Tupamaros
in the People’s Prison, which was actually a collection of safe houses throughout Montevideo.
Mitrione and Dias were held in the compound in the northern outskirts of the city, ironically just
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fifteen blocks outside of the police’s perimeter.142 Reportedly, Mitrione was being held in “a
house apparently located in the urban area, judging from noises audible outside. He was confined
in a tent within a room, on the lower half of a wooden bunk bed, with a bucket for a toilet.”143
From the beginning of his captivity, Mitrione was being interrogated as much as his condition
allowed.
The first priority for the Tupamaros was the organizations he worked for, since “the
Tupamaros found three identification cards in his pocket. One was from the Department of State,
Agency for International Development...There was also a card from the Montevideo Police
Department, and one identifying Mitrione as a member of the FBI National Academy, Associates
of Indiana.”144 The Tupamaros wanted to know about a multitude of subjects, including his
advisory work in Uruguay and Brazil, the names of Americans and Uruguayans Mitrione had
contact with, security conditions in the Embassy where Mitrione worked and CIA operations in
Latin America.145 They also hoped to gather some evidence of Mitrione’s knowledge of more
sinister practices, such as the death squads operating in Brazil and torture.146
Having gathered enough evidence against their prisoners, the Tupamaros published
Communique #6 at 1:05 a.m. on August 6th. The message was harrowing as it finally listed their
victims’ crimes. In Communique #6, the Tupamaros stated,
According to his own declarations, he has advised the Metropolitan Guard, the
Republican Guard, and other repressive forces that in recent years have killed a dozen
patriots in popular manifestations or in actions against revolutionary groups. Also,
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according to his declarations, deadly arms have been provided for the repression of the
Uruguayan people under the cynical emblem of AID.147
The Tupamaros furthered their accusations by stating that “he is representative of a power that
has massacred entire populations in Vietnam, Santo Domingo and other places.”148 The
communique then presented the Uruguayan authorities with a deadline of midnight on August 7th
to respond to the Tupamaros’ ransom demands. “In case there is no affirmative answer, we shall
consider the case closed and will do justice. If the answer is favorable, we will wait until
midnight on Tuesday the 11th for the conditions announced in previous notes to be put into
effect.”149 The threat was clear; if the Uruguayan government did not agree to the terms, the
victims would be executed.
Shortly following this announcement, Gallup published the results of a survey conducted
between August 2nd and August 6th regarding the Uruguayan public’s opinions on the Tupamaros
and the kidnappings. Their findings were that
33 percent of Uruguayans considered the kidnappings an act of vandalism; 35 percent
believed it was a legitimate revolutionary method…Moreover, 37 percent believed the
government should provide ransom by releasing imprisoned terrorists; 37 percent
believed the government should not…Finally, 60 percent believed that if kidnap victims
were not ransomed, the terrorists would nevertheless return them safe and sound; 30
percent believed the victims would not be returned.150
In this sense, the public was becoming increasingly cynical towards the Tupamaros. It is also
important to note that sixty percent believed that the Tupamaros would release their victims
without harm. This opinion was widespread and shared by most of the Uruguayan government.
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The Tupamaros had never killed a hostage before and Judge Daniel Pereira had been released
after extensive interrogation. Most believed that the Tupamaros planned to “extract all
information possible from the victims and then to publish as much derogatory information as
possible. This would constitute the victims’ sentence.”151 Despite the Tupamaros’ threat in
Communique #6, the large majority of Uruguay full-heartedly believed there was no way that
they would kill their hostages even if the government did not meet the Tupamaros’ demands,
especially considering the fact that the Tupamaros would lose public support in such an event.
Also, under the advisement of the US government, the Uruguayan government
announced that they would offer a reward of one million pesos for any good information that
would lead to the safe return of the hostages. The Ministry of Interior and Foreign Ministry
developed an independent Citizens’ Information Center to anonymously take any tips,
suggestions or other information that the public provided. The public increasingly volunteered
information, which greatly aided police investigations.
On the evening of August 6th, the president repeated his commitment to upholding the
Uruguayan Constitution, maintaining his stance of non-negotiation; the Uruguayan government
let the deadline pass. The Tupamaros responded by kidnapping another victim the following
morning to increase pressure on the Uruguayan government. The victim was a sixty-five year old
American agricultural specialist named Dr. Claude L. Fly who had a history of health problems.
At 9:15 a.m. on August 7th, three Tupamaros seized the soil expert from his laboratory. Facing
increasing pressure, President Pacheco considering resigning from his post. This had been the
Tupamaros’ goal, meaning that the Tupamaros had nearly won. Things seemed to be going their
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way. In one Tupamaro’s words: “We had reached the most favorable stage in the crisis from our
point of view, and the release or amnesty of our comrades seemed near.”152
Almería
However, the Uruguayan police made a break in the case. Several high-ranking
Tupamaro members had been reported in Malvín, the same neighborhood that Mitrione had been
kidnapped from. At 8:00 in the morning, two police officers dressed as civilians forced their way
into a ground-level apartment on Almería Street, subduing the Tupamaros guarding the place.153
The police were in luck, because the Tupamaros were hosting a meeting that morning following
the kidnapping of Dr. Fly, likely to discuss the next course of action and Mitrione’s fate. Police
officers proceeded to conduct a typical ratonera, using the two captured Tupamaros to greet the
unsuspecting Tupamaros, who would be arrested as soon as they entered. Nine Tupamaros were
arrested, including three holding the hostages’ personal effects (Fly’s passport, Dias’ ring and
Mitrione’s passport) and several high-ranking and coveted members of the Tupamaros, including
founders, Efraín Martínez Platero and Raúl Sendic.154 In several hours, half of the existing
Tupamaro leadership had been arrested. The devastating raid became known as Almería.
It was a big win for the Uruguayan effort, reinvigorating both the government and the
police, who both believed they were nearing the liberation of the hostages. Moreover, the
public’s opinion of the police was at its height. President Pacheco decided against resignation
and maintained his stance against negotiations. The Minister of the Interior “intended to
undertake [the] most extreme police measures to locate [the] kidnap victims.”155 Interrogation
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began immediately and the police intensified their searches, including a three hour search for
Mitrione. The government believed that the police’s efforts and interrogations would bring a
favorable end to the crisis. However, many worried that the arrests could threaten the hostages’
lives if the Tupamaros acted irrationally due to retaliation or lack of direction without their
leaders.
Concerned about the wellbeing of their comrades, the Tupamaros sent Communique #7
directly to the police. The Tupamaros warned that “any inflicting of death or torture or any filing
of accusations against the captured leaders would lead to severe reprisals.”156 The government
took this threat seriously for all of the following “interrogations were monitored by judges of the
Superior Court, and the terrorists were examined by physicians before and after questioning, to
assure that no torture took place.”157 The same message was repeated on August 8th, when the
Tupamaros threatened that the diplomats “will receive the same physical treatment as our
arrested comrades” in Communique #8.158 However, the interrogators received no useful
information. Raúl Sendic stated, “I am a prisoner of war. I will say nothing about the movement
of which I am a part.”159
Finding themselves at an impasse, the Uruguayan government made an unprecedented
move. On August 7th, the government received permission from the Judicial Branch to use
Sodium Pentothal, known as “truth serum” on the captured Tupamaros. The government then
requested Argentinian police experts to help conduct the interrogation with this technology. The
Argentinians arrived on the morning of August 8th to interrogate Raúl Sendic. However, they
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were not informed of the conditions that they were required to work under, considering the
Uruguayan commitment to the Constitution.
Upon arriving, the Argentinians were surprised to read a disclosure of their mission in the
Sunday newspapers, and to learn about the judicial monitoring. Since they had come
under the condition of secrecy, they refused to proceed and returned to Argentina after
witnessing an interrogation of Sendic. In their opinion, he was treated too gently, with
interrogation conditions made extremely difficult by the presence of outside legal and
medical assistance.160
Reportedly, the closest the interrogators came to torture was splashing the naked prisoners with
freezing cold water.161 However, in truth, most of the prisoners knew nothing at all, considering
their commitment to compartmentalization. Apparently, only one of the captured Tupamaros
knew where Mitrione was and it wasn’t Raúl Sendic, the reported “leader” of the Tupamaros. In
actuality, Alberto Candán, a member of Column 15, the Tupamaro’s most active, held the
knowledge that interrogators sought; he had interrogated Mitrione in the People’s Prison.
After Almería, new leaders had to be chosen, who had just lost some of their best. Raúl
Sendic explained that “From the moment we go to jail we are incapable of doing anything at all,
because we have a pre-existing protocol that says imprisoned Tupamaros lose all decisionmaking authority.”162 There were slim pickings, considering the nearly one hundred fifty
Tupamaros that were already imprisoned in the Punta Carretas prison. With few options left, the
Tupamaros were forced to choose three new leaders for the executive committee from their
ranks. All of the new leaders chosen came from the newer generation of Tupamaros; they were
young, radical and inexperienced, but were active in operations.
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The Death Sentence
On the morning of August 8th, President Pacheco received a letter from Mitrione, directed
to his wife. In a shaky hand, indicating emotional distress, Mitrione wrote: “Please advise the
Ambassador to do all in his power to get me liberated because my life depends on it.”163 He
wasn’t wrong. On the same afternoon, Communique #9 clearly stated the Tupamaros’ intent: “in
view of the government’s refusal to exchange prisoners, the MLN had decided to execute
Mitrione at noon the next day.”164 It had been decided amongst the Tupamaros. The majority of
the Tupamaros supported Mitrione’s death. Some even wanted to murder Mitrione, Dias and Fly
together for the greatest effect.165 The hostages were completely at the mercy of these new
radical leaders. While the imprisoned Tupamaros maintained good communication with those
outside, they had no impact on decision-making, meaning that the young violent radicals were
entirely in charge of the operation.
The government remained steadfast in their approach, even though the situation had
deteriorated. They promised publicly that they were doing all that was possible to secure the
releases of the Tupamaros’ hostages. The police continued raiding in a last effort and asked the
public for their continued aid to find the kidnapped diplomats. Still, the government doubted that
the Tupamaros would execute their captives.
The United States became more persistent. While the American Ambassador had been
actively involved in conversations regarding the best methods to secure the release of the
hostages before, the United States respected the Uruguayan’s methods and competence. Before,
Ambassador Adair had advocated, “For safe delivery Mitrione offer [the Tupamaros] amnesty or
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amnesty plus an award 15 million pesos. Offer amnesty to key persons now being held in return
for information leading to release of the three men.”166 However, by August 9th, the noon
deadline was weighing on everybody’s minds. The United States increasingly advocated for
reprisals against the Tupamaros.
In an exclusive message to Ambassador Adair, the Secretary of State wrote just a half
hour before the Mitrione’s deadline: “We have assumed that GOU has considered use of threat to
kill Sendic and others key MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed. If this has not been considered,
you should raise it with GOU at once.”167 This was clearly a violation of Uruguayan law and
would be a risky move within the government considering earlier concerns regarding dictatorial
acts. When the Ambassador brought up the issue with the Foreign Minister in a last minute
meeting, he stated that “his type of government did not permit such action.”168 In more blunt
terms, President Pacheco reportedly told the Foreign Minister, “This guy is either drunk or off
his rocker! What does he think Uruguay is? Viet Nam?”169 However, this didn’t mean the
Uruguayan government was beyond extralegal methods either.
During the same meeting, the Foreign Minister discussed another possibility in the case
that Mitrione did not survive. Ambassador Adair informed the Secretary of State that “the GOU
intends take what [redacted] called “severe measures” which he did not describe.”170 He later
reported that the Foreign Minister “understood that through indirect means, a threat was made to
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these prisoners that members of the “Escuadron de Muerte” (Illegal, Private Death Squad) would
take action against the prisoners’ relatives if Mitrione werz [sic] killed.”171 This exchange came
right before the noon deadline; if the Tupamaros carried through with their threat, Mitrione
would soon be dead. However, many in the Uruguayan government believed that Mitrione was
already dead as a result of his gunshot wound. Anonymous calls to the Uruguayan government
had been announcing Mitrione’s death all day and rumors had been circulating throughout the
city, making this threat very concerning.172
The Tupamaros faced another blow to their organization. The newly appointed leadership
was arrested after less than twenty-four hours in command. Now the Tupamaros were down nine
more members. To make matters worse, it became clear that the Tupamaros had lost much of
their public support, considering that “during several raiding operations, people filled the street,
cheering and applauding the policemen as they placed suspects under suspension.”173 The
Tupamaros were coming to the end of the line.
Now the Tupamaros no longer had any leadership. There wasn’t even anybody to appoint
new leaders. With nobody left to guide them, the remaining Tupamaros of Column 15 decided to
execute Dan Mitrione, the prisoner in their custody. The self-appointed leader of the group
recalled, “We saw it with the rigidity of young and inexperienced people. A certain day and time
had been given as the deadline, and if the exchange was not accepted he was going to be
executed. When we were left leaderless, we stuck to the wording of our press release.”174
At 9:00 p.m., Mitrione was informed by his captors that he would be moved to a different
location. His captors drugged him with valium before he was bound, blindfolded and placed in a
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stolen car. They drove around for a while before switching cars and driving to a desolate
location. In the early hours of the morning, the two shooters stopped the car and shot Dan
Mitrione multiple times at close range. At 4:25 a.m., shortly after Mitrione was shot, a police
patrol discovered the abandoned car. “Dan Mitrione’s body was found on the back seat of a
stolen 1948 Buick convertible. He had been bound and gagged and shot twice in the head.”175
During the autopsy, “examination of his body showed no signs of torture, binding, or other
mistreatment. His earlier wound was clean and healing well.”176 It was official: Dan Mitrione
was dead.
It immediately became clear to the Tupamaros that Mitrione’s assassination had severely
damaged both their organization and their reputation. The popular response to the murder was
one of disgust and revulsion; internationally and within Uruguay, the Tupamaros’ actions were
condemned. August 11th marked a day of mourning in Uruguay for Dan Mitrione. Over five
thousand Uruguayans visited the American embassy to pay their respects.177 Much of the public
continued to inform the police of Tupamaro activity, seeing them now as more of a criminal
element than a revolutionary group. Moreover, the public sympathized with Dan Mitrione, the
slain father of nine. Originally, “the Tupamaros [had] expected that when Mitrione’s activities
with the police were exposed, even apolitical Uruguayans would concede that he was a natural a
target.”178 Yet the Tupamaros were not able to expose him as a CIA agent involved in torture or
provide any other damaging material.179 However, Sendic later stated that the Tupamaros had
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targeted for teaching riot control procedures to the Uruguayan police that led to the deaths of
protesters.180
Allegations Against Mitrione
The questions that still linger with Mitrione is whether he was a CIA officer and whether
he was involved in torture during his time with OPS To this day, this is still a controversial
question. It’s a complicated history and everybody has a stake in the answers. Dan Mitrione was
stationed in Uruguay in 1969. Previously, he had worked as an advisor in Brazil for seven years.
Officially, Dan Mitrione’s position as a Public Safety Advisor entailed making requisitions for
weapons and supplies and training officers to improve investigations with the tools that the AID
program provided. He also worked to improve communications between police, traveling
throughout Uruguay to inspect police stations. Lastly, Mitrione was tasked with choosing
officers for further training in the United States. Of course, the real purpose of OPS was to fight
communism within Latin America which involved more dubious practices.
As Chief Police Advisor, Dan Mitrione was stationed within the American Embassy,
alongside other OPS advisors. It’s well established that CIA officers were often imbedded within
the Embassy, especially in the OPS program. This allowed them close access to important
figures and supplies, considering that illicit equipment was often brought in through the
embassy’s diplomatic pouch.181 In fact, when Mitrione took his position, he replaced a CIA
officer, William Cantrell. Some astute policers suspected Mitrione of being a CIA officer
because he was well-equipped and well-connected. However, that was his job as Chief Police
Advisor in Montevideo. Despite this, leftists declared that “his AID credentials fooled no one.
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Mr. Mitrione was a well-known CIA agent.”182 This rumor was established as far away as East
Germany, when a publisher listed Mitrione in a book entitled Who’s Who in CIA.183 Of course,
the CIA denied the allegations that Mitrione was one of theirs. Others believe that Mitrione was
merely ambitious and cooperated with the CIA officers that worked within Uruguay.184
Naturally, interrogation is an integral part of any police institution and would be the focus
of training any good detective. However, it is clear that the United States actively taught police
and military officers enhanced interrogation techniques through the International Police
Academy and the School of the Americas. Throughout Latin America, American influence and
torture seemed to go hand in hand. During Mitrione’s time in Brazil, prisoners “attributed the
new Brazilian efficiency to United States training. Before the US advisers helped to centralize
information, it had taken days to discover whether a new prisoner was a leader in the rebel
movement. Now it took hours.”185 Reportedly, police officers attended forty minute classes on
torture that used political prisoners to illustrate the techniques.186 However, this does not
necessarily mean that Dan Mitrione was behind the new techniques. When discussing what
Mitrione would do if he witnessed Brazilian police abusing a prisoner, a Brazilian police officer
replied that he would merely leave the room.187
The accusations that Dan Mitrione taught torture techniques or led interrogations in
Uruguay came from three men, representing very different interests. There was Alejandro Otero,
an Uruguayan police officer, who had been trained in counterintelligence by both the
Argentinian Information Service and AID’s International Police Academy, before being
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recruited by the CIA.188 There was also Miguel Angel Benítez Segovia, who was a Tupamaro
working undercover as a police officer.189 Finally, the most bizarre accuser was “Manuel the
Cuban.” Manuel Hevia was a Cuban who was studying in the US when he was recruited by the
CIA. Manuel accepted the position and was sent to work undercover in the Uruguayan embassy.
However, in reality, he was a Cuban double agent.190
Alejandro Otero was an ambitious detective and a well-known figure in Uruguay, due to
his frequent press releases on police activity and the Tupamaros. In 1969, he spoke openly about
police brutality when he was interviewed by an Argentine reporter. 191 He talked about his friend,
a Tupamaro supporter, who had been interrogated by the police. She told him that Mitrione had
watched and assisted in her torture. When he confronted Dan Mitrione, he listened
“impassively.” Afterwards, Otero was “put on ice” before losing his job over the interview.192
Otero repeated the same story to a Brazilian journalist four days after Mitrione’s death.
US advisers, especially Mitrione, had introduced scientific methods of torture…The
advisors advocated psychological torture, Otero told Aymoré [the journalist], to create
despair. In the next room, they would play tapes of women and children screaming and
tell the prisoner that it was his family being tortured. They used electrical shocks under
fingernails, on the genitals. He told Aymoré about his friend, the woman who had been
tortured, and about the way Mitrione ignored his protests. Mitrione had been very hard in
his methods, Otero said.193
Shortly afterwards, Alejandro Otero recanted his story. Considering the Brazilian police’s
allegiance to Mitrione, it seems possible that he may have been threatened by the death squads.
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Working undercover in the Uruguayan police, Miguel Angel Benítez recorded
information about the inner workings and key players, including Mitrione. In one report, he
recorded a conversation he overheard where Mitrione offered advice to officers: “undress him
completely and force him to stand facing the wall. Then have one of the youngest policemen
goose him. Afterward, put him into a cell and hold him for three days with nothing to drink. On
the third day, pass through to him a pot of water mixed with urine.”194 The advice was meant as a
joke, considering its sexual overtones. However, alongside Mitrione’s joking advice, “he had
always emphasized finding out as much as possible about a prisoner before the interrogation
began. Learn the suspect’s breaking point and reach it quickly, he told the interrogating
officers.”195 When teaching about torture, much of the information that Americans provided was
hypothetical; while students were taught techniques, instructors would not directly advocate
them, however the message was clear.
Benítez never saw Mitrione torture a prisoner, but he knew that he had directed several
interrogations. He also credited the changes within the police station to Mitrione. “When
Mitrione arrived in Montevideo, the police were torturing prisoners with a rudimentary electric
needle that had come from Argentina. Mitrione arranged for the police to get newer electric
needles of varying thickness. Some needles were so thin they could be slipped between the
teeth.”196 Like in Brazil, other Uruguayan officers recall Mitrione casually walking in on
interrogations, where Tupamaros were being tortured.197
The most damning information came from the Cuban agent. Hevia reported that he had
been invited to Mitrione’s house, where he had built a soundproofed cellar to teach officers
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torture techniques. Graduates of the International Police Academy would gather in his cellar,
where Mitrione provided bichicones, or beggars to demonstrate the effects of electrical shock on
various portions of the body. He goes on to describe a lengthy conversation the two shared,
where Mitrione described his philosophy of interrogation. “After all that, the interrogation
begins. Now the only pain should come from the instrument you’ve chosen to use. Mitrione said,
“the precise pain, in the precise place, in the precise amount to achieve the effect.”198 However,
as a Cuban agent, he clearly had a strong motivation to discredit Yankee involvement in Latin
America.
Even though all three accounts clearly accuse Dan Mitrione of involvement in torture, it
is clear that his story is complicated. All three represent different allegiances, yet all have
different stories. Otero was guided by his morals. Even if he was on the CIA’s payroll, he was
arguably most affiliated with Uruguayan interests. For this reason, I find his account to be
persuasive, since he was notably candid in his interviews and had little motivation to paint
Mitrione in a negative light. Likewise, I believe Benítez is a credible source, considering the fact
that the statements he sent to the Tupamaros were modest and unexaggerated. Both of their
statements are consistent with police officers who had contact with Dan Mitrione in Brazil and
Uruguay.
Based on the various testimonies, I am of the opinion that Daniel Mitrione was aware of
the prisoner abuse and torture that occurred. At minimum, he facilitated the practice by sending
officers to learn torture techniques at the International Police Academy and School of Americas.
As a Public Safety Officer, he also acquired equipment, such as electric generators and needles
for officers to use, knowing full well what they were intended for. Moreover, based on officers’
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testimonies, Mitrione seemed comfortable with the practice, willingly walking into interrogation
rooms and discussing the practice. I strongly believe that Mitrione kept his hands clean; while he
may have advocated and instructed on methods of torture, he never partook. This sentiment is
corroborated by the fact that the Tupamaros were never able to prove that Mitrione tortured
prisoners, even with members imbedded in the police.

58

Uruguay’s Moral Decline
Directly following the murder of Dan Mitrione, the Uruguayan government issued
emergency security measures. At 5:15 p.m. on August 10th, the same day Mitrione had been
killed, the General Assembly “voted to waive temporarily the rights guaranteed under Article 31
of Uruguay’s Constitution. Declaring a state of emergency, the assembly suspended for twenty
days the rights of property, assembly, personal liberty and free expression,”199 leading Uruguay
in its path towards a dictatorship.
Meanwhile, the Tupamaros continued their campaign of violent operations as part of the
next phase of the revolution. These new operations were increasingly terroristic, which was a
clear divergence from their earlier philosophy. In September, the Tupamaros launched Plan
Cacao, a campaign of bombings that targeted symbols of oligarchies and imperialism, even if
they housed innocent civilians. Plan Satán continued on; hostages were gradually ransomed off
and new victims were kidnapped, including the British Ambassador, Geoffrey Jackson, who was
kidnapped in January of 1971. The Tupamaros also continued Línea Hostigamiento, killing
police officers indiscriminately. By this time, the Tupamaros had lost much of the support from
the Uruguayan public due to their reign of terror. However, the Tupamaros were certainly not
dead, and they had no intention of stopping. In fact, their organization had reached peak
recruitment, as angry radical youths joined the organization.200
In the summer of 1971, the Tupamaros worked to free their comrades. They planned to
use the sewers, which they had been mapping meticulously since 1965.201 After a few scrapped
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plans, the Tupamaros settled on Operación Estrella. In the Tres Cruces neighborhood, the
Tupamaros tunneled to the women’s prison from the sewers. At about 8:30 p.m., the Tupamaros
broke through the last of the floor, while the prisoners loudly danced to hide the noise. With that
portion complete, the Tupamaras returned to their cells and prepared dummies to hide their
escape. Then at 10:00 p.m., the Tupamaras returned to the hole and made their escape, where
they were guided by their comrades through the sewers to a hijacked home.202 In total, thirtyeight women escaped on July 17th, 1971.
The Tupamaros success was replicated three months later when one hundred eleven
prisoners escaped from Puntas Carretas. Within the prison, Tupamaros tunneled between cells
and from the first floor to the ground floor to reach their escape tunnel. On September 5th, they
traveled through the forty foot tunnel that connected to a house across the street, which was held
hostage by Tupamaros. There, the prisoners were provided with false papers and an escape route.
In total, one hundred six Tupamaros escaped, leaving only seventy-four Tupamaros in prison.
The Tupamaros had effectively freed all of their leaders, as well as their most skilled and
talented members. However, as a result of the two prison escapes, the state lost faith in the
police’s ability to combat the Tupamaros. On September 9th, 1971, the military was given full
control of the anti-terrorist campaign against the Tupamaros.
Immediately following the prison break, the Tupamaros called an unprecedented
armistice for the coming election. A new party emerged that provided an alternative to
Uruguay’s conservative politicians. The Frente Amplio was a coalition of socialists, communists
and Christian democrats campaigning on the premise of land redistribution, nationalizing banks
and renegotiating Uruguay’s immense foreign debt, which had reached five hundred million.203
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Inspired by Salvador Allende’s recent success in Chile, the Tupamaros supported the Frente
Amplio even though it was contrary to their philosophy.
The coalition was certainly controversial; they were considered either Uruguay’s last
chance to avoid a civil war or a revolutionary mobilization that would lead the country to
communism.204 While many supported an alternative to the traditional corrupt politicians, they
were alienated by the strong presence of the Communist Party. In the end, the traditional parties
won with the triumph of the Colorado Party. Juan María Bordaberry, who was handpicked by
President Pacheco, won the election. As a fervent anti-communist with an inclination towards
fascism, Bordaberry planned to follow Pacheco’s policies to eliminate the Tupamaros by using
extraordinary presidential and police powers.205
With the new president inaugurated, the Tupamaros resumed their campaign against the
state on April 14th, 1972 by assassinating four members of the death squad.206 The Tupamaros
were not prepared for the state’s response. While they had been on hiatus, the military had been
preparing for a more effective anti-subversive campaign. And on April 15th, President
Bordaberry acquired additional emergency powers, declaring a state of internal war. Under
martial law, the military was empowered in their campaign against the Tupamaros, who were
subject to military courts. Between April and June, over one thousand suspects were arrested.207
Moreover, it was clear that the military was torturing suspects to garner more information. On
July 11th, Congress passed an anti-subversion law which subjected accused subversives to
military courts and suspended individual rights, allowing searches without a warrant and
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imprisonment on suspicion of subversion.208 The new anti-subversion law “gave juridical
recognition to the suspension of individual liberties and the violent repression that had been
conducted under the declaration.”209 By July 15th, the military announced that they had
discovered seventy safe houses, captured over six hundred Tupamaros and killed one hundred.210
The state of internal war allowed the military more leeway in their campaign against
subversion. Their success came from a reliance on enhanced interrogation techniques.
Suspected Tupamaro collaborators were said to be subjected to a routine consisting of,
perhaps, two days of planton (prolonged standing without food), a week of capucha
(completely blindfolded imprisonment), and a few mornings of submarinos (immersion
of the prisoner’s head in water, up to the point of asphyxiation, every half hour or so).
During the interrogation proper, prisoners were supposedly beaten in ways that are hard
to trace - for instance, by simultaneous blows against the ears. Forms of psychological
torture (such as interruption of sleep, withholding of food or drink, and threats) and druginduced confessions were also frequently reported.211
Like other guerrilla groups, the Tupamaros had a policy of enduring torture for twenty-four
hours to provide the rest of the organization time to escape. However, the military’s campaign
was too prolific to maintain this safeguard. Under duress, there was little choice but to talk. And
considering the fact that many Tupamaros had been to prison, they would be able to identify
more members. In this manner, the military was provided a plethora of information regarding
members, associates and safe houses. By the end of 1972, about five thousand people had been
arrested by the military and three thousand Tupamaros were being held.212 Roughly seven
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hundred Tupamaros fled the country and three hundred Tupamaros remained at large.213 The
Tupamaros had come to an end; their organization was destroyed.
At this point, only four percent of the Uruguayans believed that the Tupamaros were
motivated by social justice, compared to sixty percent the year before.214 Despite this, the
Tupamaros had a peculiar effect on the military, who were becoming increasingly politicized.
“All of them, it appears, condemned the guerrilla movement for its lawless violence, but some
were convinced of the rightness of the Tupamaros’ demands for radical reform by the capture of
proofs they had assembled of extensive injustice and corruption in the existing regime.”215 Now
that the Tupamaros were in military custody, there was an exchange of political ideas that was
not previously possible. As military officers became more familiar with their prisoners, the
military gained an understanding of the reasoning behind the Tupamaros and the ways they had
hoped to better Uruguayan society.216 More importantly, the Tupamaros shared evidence of
corruption in the highest spheres, from businessmen to politicians.217 Uruguay’s political
processes had been discredited, leading the military to demand a larger role in politics.
As a result of the Tupamaros’ accounts, the military demanded extensive reforms to
address the economic problems and rampant corruption in February of 1973. It was clear that a
revolt was brewing, but the military’s complaints rang true for most Uruguayans.218 When their
ultimatum was disregarded, the military demonstrated their force on February 12th, “when
fourteen vintage tanks lumbered through the capital to Prado Park, near the Presidential
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residence;” the president was forced to surrender.219 “Henceforth the armed forces would play a
new role in public life with the mission to safeguard national developments.”220 The military
would advise the president through the newly inaugurated National Security Commission,
allowing the military to maintain a democratic façade. However, the reality was clear.
On June 27th, 1973, President Bordaberry illegally dissolved Congress under the
military’s advisement. The Uruguayan public challenged this development with protests and
demonstrations. Police reported that mobs of up to two thousand people gathered at the Plaza
Independencia, where the president is located. Over two hundred people were arrested on one
night for illegal assembly and activity, including firebombing vehicles and stoning or shooting
military and police personnel.221 Demonstrations were quelled after two weeks. Political activity
was forbidden and censorship was imposed to stifle criticism.222 “Widespread repression was
then unleashed, with the arrest of leading political figures of all parties, trade unionists and
members of the university.”223 After the successful elimination of civilian protests and the
oppositional left, Uruguay was unable to prevent the end of democracy. Uruguay was at the
mercy of the authoritarian civil – military dictatorship that had taken root.
The new regime defended the illegal measures taken, proclaiming that they were saving
their country by “rooting out corruption of the past and drawing the line for a new morality and
new approach to their country’s problems.”224 The main focus was the economy, which had
deteriorated significantly in the last few years. In order to solve their country’s economic issues,
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the military knew that they needed “an experienced civilian leader who was better qualified” to
implement the Brazilian-inspired development policy.225 When discussing the new regime in
Uruguay, President Bordaberry told the American Ambassador that
It would be a great mistake if Americans were to interpret developments here in any way
as the establishment of a military regime in Uruguay. If the military had wanted to take
power, he said, there would have been nothing to prevent their doing so. The fact is, he
said, that the military did not want to take power, but rather to develop a stronger level of
participation in government by providing the civilian governmnt [sic] with the necessary
authority to have a chance of solving the obvious problems which had been plaguing the
country for such along [sic] time…In the long run, he said, everything they have done has
really been an effort to end the stagnation of more than two decades and to save
Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions rather do violence to them.226
In this manner, President Bordaberry defended Uruguay’s loss of democracy and the new
authoritarian regime. Uruguay would remain under a repressive military-led dictatorship for
twelve years. During this time period, several thousand political prisoners, including a large
number of Tupamaros, were held captive and tortured. Uruguay had the highest per capita ratio
of political prisoners in the world, with one of every fifty-four Uruguayan citizens detained.227
The country remained under a military-led dictatorship until 1985, when the armed allowed the
transfer of power to a civilian leader.
Conclusion
Ironically, the Tupamaros’ efforts to ignite a revolution and overthrow the government
led to the collapse of democracy in Uruguay. Plan Satán had been intended to unseat President
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Pacheco, which was nearly successful. However, in a turn of events, several of the Tupamaros’
leaders were captured. Reinvigorated, President Pacheco renewed his efforts pertinaciously,
determined to bring an end to the guerrilla group that had threatened his rule. However, before he
could triumph over the Tupamaros, Daniel Mitrione was killed. More determined than ever to
prevent another death at the hands of the Tupamaros, President Pacheco proclaimed a state of
emergency, enacting a number of security measures to bring an end to this affair. These
measures allowed the police to continue their search with little hindrance. As the election neared,
President Pacheco intended to run for another term, but he was prevented by the Constitution. He
proceeded to choose his successor, Juan María Bordaberry, who successfully won the election.
Bordaberry continued Pacheco’s campaign, continuing the string of security measures. Finally in
April of 1972, Bordaberry declared martial law and allowed the military to take control of
operations against the Tupamaros. As a result, the military became more politicized and sought
dominion over the government, leading to the military coup of 1973.
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